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A B S T R A C T   
The recent wave of populism sweeping Europe and the Americas generated considerable interest among political 
scientists, economists, sociologists and to some extent, geographers. The vast majority of these studies focuses on 
individual voter decisions or national comparisons over time but neglects the within-country spatial variation of 
the populist vote. This paper addresses this shortcoming and applies spatial econometric techniques to explore 
possible explanations for spatial variation in the increase of the populist right vote between the 2013 and 2017 
national elections in Austria for 2118 municipalities. Spatial variation in voting shares can result from (1) 
compositional effects, regional differences in the composition of voters with different characteristics, (2) broad 
spatial, historically evolved institutional differences, such as membership to one of the nine states, (3) unequal 
integration of different types of regions into the global economy, such as peripheral regions, central urban re-
gions, old industrial regions or tourist areas, (4) spatial vote spillovers due to localized social networks, and (5) 
unobserved spatial processes. We find that the populist right vote gains in Austrian municipalities are affected by 
all processes, but that the type of regions becomes insignificant once we correct for unobservable spatial 
structures in the regression framework. The increase in the share of foreigners, the share of foreigners, income 
and inequality levels, educational differences, selected state membership, as well as spatial spillovers of populist 
right voting are all important to explain spatial variation in the rise of the populist right vote.   
1. Introduction 
The recent rise of populist right parties in Europe and the United 
States has triggered a flurry of research on the possible causes and 
patterns of this vote (Manow, 2018; Mudde, 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 
2013). Explanations focus primarily on changes in populist right voting 
over time (Eribon, 2009; Mair, 2013; Müller, 2016), individual electoral 
choices (Guiso et al., 2017) and national differences in the patterns and 
trends of left or right populist voting (Rodrik, 2018). Increasingly, re-
searchers exploit within country variation in populist right voting as 
individual voting decisions do not take place in a vacuum but are shaped 
by socio-spatial context and broad economic and socio-cultural changes 
that affect local populations differently generating spatially differenti-
ated demand for populist right voting (Autor et al., 2017; Essletzbichler 
et al., 2018; Rodriguez-Pose, 2018). This work links those 
socio-economic changes to the rise in populist right voting, but regions 
are treated as observations (such as countries or individuals in national 
and individual level studies) that are argued to match better individual 
voting choices with socio-economic (compositional) context (Manow, 
2018). This research ignores the relative location of those spatial con-
tainers and potential local spillover channels between sub-national 
territories. There are two potential problems with this conceptualiza-
tion of regions: First, electoral choices are not made by individuals in a 
social vacuum but are formed through interaction with other in-
dividuals. As social networks tend to be spatially constrained we would 
expect electoral outcomes at the regional level to be influenced by past 
electoral outcomes in neighboring regions (Agnew, 1987; Agnew & 
Shin, 2020; Allesandretti et al., 2018; Zuckerman, 2005). Second, 
ignoring spatial dependence may result in biased and/or inefficient 
parameter estimates of non-spatial cross-sectional models of electoral 
outcomes (Anselin, 1988). 
This paper employs spatial econometric tools (Anselin, 1988; Anselin 
& Rey, 2014; Elhorst, 2014; Fischer & Wang, 2011; LeSage & Pace, 
2009) to examine the impact of local spillover effects to explain the 
spatial variation in the increase of the vote share of the Austrian 
Freedom Party (FPÖ), a populist radical right party (Fallend, 2013; 
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Hafez et al., 2019; Heinisch, 2002; Heinisch & Marent, 2016; Mouffe, 
2005), between the 2013 and 2017 national elections for 2118 Austrian 
municipalities. We start with a simple cross-sectional model to explore 
the role of compositional effects and gradually add complexity through 
the inclusion of state dummies, regional type dummies, spillover effects 
and unobserved spatial dependence. More specifically, we explore the 
following questions: First, are socio-demographic and economic differ-
ences between Austrian municipalities sufficient to explain spatial 
variation in the increase of populist right (FPÖ) vote shares? Second, 
after controlling for compositional effects, do FPÖ vote share increases 
vary significantly across its nine states? Third, do FPÖ vote share in-
creases vary according to the functional type a municipality is classified 
as (rural, old industrial, urban)? Fourth, do spatial network effects 
expressed through spillovers of the FPÖ vote from neighboring munic-
ipalities influence FPÖ vote shares? Fifth, are these findings robust in 
specifications that control for unobserved spatial processes in the error 
term? 
In order to address these questions the paper is structured as follows. 
Section 2 briefly introduces the literature on populism in general and the 
rise of the populist radical right FPÖ in Austria in particular. Section 3 
reviews recent literature on subnational variation in populist right 
voting and, based on this literature, formulates a set of expectations to 
be examined empirically. Section 4 discusses methods and data, section 
5 reports the empirical results and section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. The rise of populist right voting in Austria 
Without entering the complex debate about the definition of popu-
lism (Agnew & Shin, 2020; Blühdorn & Butzlaff, 2019; Brubaker, 2017; 
Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Mouffe, 2005; Mudde, 2017; Müller, 2016) we 
identify key commonalities among distinct populist movements that are 
relevant to understand current political processes. Very broadly, popu-
lism comprises two common traits. First is the idea of “taking politics to 
the people” by taking away power from the dominant political estab-
lishment of existing political parties, usually center right and left parties, 
assumed to be corrupted and captured by private interests. The second 
characteristic is “the framing of ‘the people’ in the entirely territorial 
sense of a founding or native group, particularly the ‘ordinary people’ in 
it, increasingly threatened by foreign and/or domestic invaders, mi-
grants, or cultural influences” (Agnew & Shin, 2020, p. 7). The “people” 
are mobilized through distinctive discursive strategies that focus on 
“oppositional demagoguery” rather than constructive policy proposals. 
Populist leaders promise voters “the protection in the face of fear and 
danger” (Agnew & Shin, 2020, p. 6). It is the sense of loss, the need to 
“reclaim the country” rather than actual discussions in how that would 
be done that form the center of populist rhetoric. This message is 
delivered by a “strong” leader who knows what the “people” need and is 
able to pull together a heterogeneous electorate by producing an 
emotional connection to some constructed group identity. 
This general characterization of populism captures a wide variety of 
national and regional populist movements and candidates. “The people” 
and “elites” can be defined flexibly and include the political establish-
ment inside the Beltway, EU bureaucrats, global cultural elites or 
traditional center parties such as the Austrian Socialist and Conservative 
Parties supposedly distributing jobs and resources to their respective 
clienteles in exchange for votes at the expense of “the silent majority left 
behind”. Outsiders and forces threatening the identity and material 
welfare of “the people” can be Muslims, Jews, immigrants, refugees, 
China, globalization or EU regulations (Brubaker, 2017; Mudde, 2017; 
Müller, 2016). While neither the existence of “elites” nor insider-outside 
dynamics are new, changes in the economic and cultural conditions 
since the mid-1970s as well as recent austerity measures in response to 
the Great Recession (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015) are often assumed to have 
increased the threat to economic wellbeing and identity and hence, led 
to a surge in the demand for populist parties and agendas. Economic 
trends identified as causes of new “economic cleavages” are skill-biased 
technological change, globalization, ensuing rising income inequality, 
declining welfare state expenditures and job security, increasing 
competition for welfare state services through immigration and indus-
trial decline in countries of the Global North (Autor et al. 2017; Eribon, 
2009; Gidron & Hall, 2017; Kriesi et al., 2006; Manow, 2018; Rodrik, 
2018). Industrial workers with little formal education are seen as pri-
mary victims of those processes and hence, more susceptible to populist 
messages. Others argue that the populist backlash is the result of new 
“cultural cleavages” with white, male, materialist, working class iden-
tities being challenged by feminism, idealism, LGBTQ+ rights and 
cosmopolitanism often resulting in a radical majoritarianism, the 
assertion of the rights of the “silent majority” against the claims of mi-
norities (Brubaker, 2017; Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 
2009). Victims of those trends are supposed to be the uneducated, the 
old as well as the historical white, male working class (Case & Deaton, 
2020; Castel & Dörre, 2009; Dörre, 2018). Evidence that traditional 
center-left and center-right parties are no longer able to satisfy the de-
mands of the “culturally and economically left behind” are declining 
voter participation in elections and a declining share of center-party 
votes (Mair, 2013). This demand is then satisfied, in part, by populist 
parties who develop flexible political strategies to exacerbate feelings of 
insecurity and offer simple “solutions” to complex problems (Marquart, 
2013; Ötsch, 2002). 
As in the majority of European countries, populism in Austria is 
associated with the radical right garnering support through xenophobic 
messages and the rejection of social integration of marginalized groups 
to “protect” the cultural and ethnic autonomy of “its people” (Betz, 
1994; Heinisch & Marent, 2016; Rydgren, 2005; Stockemer & Lamon-
tagne, 2014). With the take-over of the party by Jörg Haider in 1986, the 
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) can be defined as populist radical right 
party (Fallend, 2013; Hafez et al., 2019; Hauch et al., 2002; Mouffe, 
2005; Pelinka et al., 2008; Stockemer & Lamontagne, 2014). The FPÖ 
was founded in 1956 as right wing alternative to the center left Sozia-
listische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) and the center right Östereichische 
Volkspartei (ÖVP) appealing to Ex-Nazis and others dissatisfied with the 
mainstream parties (Heinisch, 2002). Between 1966 and 1986, the party 
moved from the extreme towards the center right attempting to service 
the liberal wing of the party but remained insignificant and averaged 
only six percent of the popular vote during that period. With pledges to 
curb immigration, xenophobic and racist rhetoric, focus on public cor-
ruption and political influence peddling inherent in the “Proporz” sys-
tem1 as well as with personal charisma, Jörg Haider moved the party to 
the right and transformed it into one of the first and most successful 
populist radical right parties in Europe (Hafez et al., 2019; Stockemer & 
Lamontagne, 2014) increasing the vote share of the FPÖ from five 
percent in 1983 to 26.9 percent in 1999 overtaking the ÖVP as second 
largest party and joining the ÖVP in a coalition government (see Fig. 1). 
The unpreparedness for governing, shortage of personnel with policy 
experience and an inability to translate the FPÖ’s agenda into public 
policy resulted in internal frictions between different fractions and the 
break-up of the coalition government. In the ensuing national elections 
of 2002 the vote share of the FPÖ dropped from 26.9 percent to 10 
percent but nevertheless, the party leadership decided to join again a 
coalition government with the now, much stronger, ÖVP. Ongoing 
frictions between the moderate and radical German nationalist factions 
prompted Haider to take a group of relative moderates out of the party 
and formed the new BZÖ (The Alliance for the Future of Austria). The 
BZÖ attempted to position itself as a more liberal and moderate alter-
native to the FPÖ and remained in the coalition while the FPÖ, under the 
leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache, went into opposition to 
1 The “proporz” system refers to the allocation of public offices, leadership 
posts in nationalized industries, the public broadcasting corporation (ORF) and 
industry/worker organizations and interest groups (chamber of commerce, 
chamber of labor, etc.) according to party membership. 
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reconstitute itself as radical, right-wing, populist opposition party 
(Fallend, 2013; Hafez et al., 2019). 
Under the leadership of Strache, the FPÖ rebuilt its core voter base 
by focusing, almost exclusively, on patriotism, defense of Austrian cul-
ture and tradition, security and welfare chauvinism positioning itself 
against Turkish accession to the EU, taking ownership of the immigra-
tion issue and portraying itself as defender of Christian cultural values 
against immigrants, in particular Muslim immigrants (Hafez et al., 
2019). The strategy proved hugely successful and, on the back of the 
“refugee crisis”2, almost delivered the presidency to their candidate in 
20163 and boosted the FPÖ vote share to 26.0 percent in the 2017 na-
tional elections (gaining 5.5 percentage points on the 2013 elections) 
(Bodlos & Plescia, 2018; Plescia et al., 2020). As in 1999, joining the 
ÖVP in a coalition government proved futile as a quick succession of 
scandals triggered re-elections in 2019 where the FPÖ vote share 
dropped from 26.0 to 16.2 percent. 
While much of the literature on the rise of the FPÖ focuses on the 
supply of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies by the 
FPÖ to exploit emerging cultural cleavages (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; 
Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), rising unemployment rates, the decline of 
nationalized industries and rising work precariousness (Castel & Dörre, 
2009; Dörre, 2018) coupled with high rates of immigration made the 
exploitation of this cleavage possible. The economic and cultural factors 
associated with radical right populism such as modernization, economic 
crisis, cosmopolitanism, or “ethnic competition”, are called on to un-
derstand rising radical right populism in a country as a whole but they 
struggle to explain persistent sub-national spatial variation in populist 
right voting. 
3. The geography of radical right populism in Austria 
While social scientists recognized the need to think geographically 
about politics and elections until the 1960s (eg. Key, 1949; Lazarsfeld 
et al., 1944) two trends led them to abandon a spatial perspective. First, 
borrowing from micro-economics, researchers started to focus on 
rational electoral choices by autonomous individual agents. Second, 
prediction of electoral outcomes at the scale of the nation state rather 
than detailed explanation of how majorities were generated from a so-
cially and spatially heterogeneous electorate became the sole focus of 
political science. Applying increasingly sophisticated econometric 
techniques on national survey data, researchers assumed that detailed 
information of individual voter characteristics will suffice for good 
prediction (Agnew & Shin, 2017). Two problems emerge from that: 
Econometric studies attempting to predict shares of populist right 
movements based on individual characteristics within and across na-
tions largely failed to find a single “smoking gun”, partly because of poor 
census data and partly, because the work fails to model the process in 
how voters make decisions in the real world (Agnew, 1987; Agnew & 
Shin, 2020; Amengay & Stockemer, 2019). Before developing a set of 
expectations that inform the empirical analysis on the spatial variation 
in FPÖ vote shares, this section summarizes briefly the theoretical ar-
guments for explaining geographic variation in electoral outcomes in 
general. 
First, individuals with particular socio-demographic characteristics 
influenced differently by the newly emerging economic and/or cultural 
cleavages are distributed unevenly across a national territory. If those 
characteristics are shown to influence the voting preferences and 
behavior then this uneven spatial distribution of individuals with 
different characteristics will produce spatially uneven electoral out-
comes. In this case, the spatial locations of places in relation to each 
other are irrelevant. All that is required is information on those char-
acteristics. Regions are reduced to “a-spatial” observations that can, like 
individuals or nation states, be entered in cross sectional regression 
analysis. 
Second, global and national economic and cultural changes affect 
places differently because of their position in the global spatial division 
of labor, i.e., whether they are global cities, old declining manufacturing 
regions or rapidly depopulating rural areas (Agnew, 1996). While in-
dividual fates are here tied up with the histories of actual places and so 
influence their electoral choices, it would still be sufficient to collect 
information on those place characteristics and examine if a higher or 
lower share of people in particular types of places vote for populist right 
parties. Here again, places are reduced to containers that could be 
placed arbitrarily within a country. However, while the position of the 
region on the map, location, is irrelevant for the electoral outcome, the 
type of region is not if the type of region is linked to its economic fate in a 
changing global spatial division of labor. This argument has been 
explored more recently by economists and economic geographers 
looking at the role of import competition, globalization or 
de-industrialization on regional differences of electoral outcomes (Autor 
et al. 2017; Dijkstra et al., 2020; Essletzbichler et al., 2018; Rodri-
guez-Pose, 2018; Rodriguez-Pose et al., 2020; Rodrik, 2018). 
Third, moving away from a conceptualization of individuals as 
autonomous agents, social psychologists established that individuals’ 
attitudes are influenced by their family, friends, colleagues, in short, 
their social networks. As daily routines that allow individuals to interact 
with others are spatially constrained, a small number of locations will 
shape people’s attitudes (Allesandretti et al., 2018). Situational context 
enters interpersonal interactions, the formation of values, judgements of 
ethics, consumption decisions or the attribution of trust and knowledge. 
Social rules, conventions, habits, cultural and religious practices are 
place specific and influence electoral choice. There, substantial differ-
ences in collective attitudes and electoral choice between urban and 
rural areas, global cities and small manufacturing towns or along state 
lines often reflect historical, political and hence, cultural and social 
differences that cannot be reduced to economic differences between or 
compositional effects of places (Agnew 1987, 1996; Eribon, 2009; 
Fallend, 2013). Social media appears to have little impact on the 
importance of face-to-face interaction and localized social exchange 
(Dunbar, 2016; Dunbar et al., 2015). 
Fourth, while the local socio-economic environment and local 















Fig. 1. Rising FPÖ voter shares in Austria, 1956–2019. 
Source: www.wahldatenbank.at. Accessed May 2, 2021. 
2 The “refugee crisis” refers to the increase in the number of refugees from the 
war in Syria. Consequently and according to data from the UNHCR the number 
of asylum seekers in Austria increased from 22,745 in 2014 to 80,060 in 2015 
and 76,382 in 2016 (https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/? 
url=Dh4gTF. Accessed May 2, 2021). These heightened numbers were turned 
into a political crisis by the FPÖ and the ÖVP (that also argued for restricted 
immigration numbers) such that the election of 2017 became, de facto, a single 
issue election around immigration (Bodlos & Plescia, 2018; Plescia et al., 2020).  
3 In the end, Alexander van der Bellen, a former member of the Green Party 
narrowly won against the FPÖ candidate Norbert Hofer in the run-off elections. 
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exert the largest influence on individual voting behavior (Cox, 1969; 
Pattie & Johnston, 2000) it is unclear how far the “neighborhood” ex-
tends geographically. People’s private social networks and their daily 
practices (shopping, working, leisure) may extend to neighboring mu-
nicipalities. Hence, the electoral choice of voters in neighboring mu-
nicipalities in prior elections may exert an impact on voter choices in a 
particular municipality. In addition, research shows that social stigma is 
attached to radical right parties and may keep voters from casting a vote 
for them (Harteveld et al., 2017; Harteveld et al. 2019). However, social 
acceptability of radical right parties may be enhanced, if they were 
successful in neighboring municipalities in previous elections. If these 
assumptions have any purchase, then, as a minimal requirement, we 
would have to augment simple cross-sectional analysis to allow for 
spatial dependence in electoral choices. 
Fifth, political geographers have demonstrated that parties need and 
are able to exploit different grievances in different places (Flint, 2001; 
O’Loughlin et al., 1994). This means that party strategies change so that 
they are able to recruit voters from different social and economic mi-
lieus. In this case, the process generating electoral outcomes would no 
longer be spatially stationary. Dealing with spatial non-stationarity 
would require a different modelling approach as the strength of the 
relationships between variables would vary over space. Spatially 
weighted regression (Fotheringham et al., 2000) could be employed in 
this context. 
All of those factors and processes together are expected to yield 
spatially varying shares of populist right voting. Because neither of them 
is independent of the other, we can only explore their impact through 
different, and increasingly complex, exploratory (spatial) cross-sectional 
regression models (see below). The analysis is designed to indicate 
whether the inclusion of spatial dependence is necessary, if national 
models of populist right voting based on sub-national variation in voting 
outcomes offer adequate explanatory accounts of populist right voting, 
or if the inclusion of spatial dependence and spatial indicator variables 
improves upon simple cross-sectional models. For this purpose, this 
paper examines the spatial patterns of increasing populist right vote 
shares in Austrian municipalities between 2013 and 2017. As the use of 
spatially weighted regression analysis goes beyond the scope of this 
paper, we will not examine the impact of spatial non-stationarity on 
voting shares. 
Although the national trend of increasing FPÖ vote shares is 
mirrored in rising FPÖ shares at the state and/or district levels (Heinisch 
&Marent, 2016; Stockemer & Lamontagne, 2014), substantial spatial 
variation in the FPÖ vote shares persist. Despite these persisting dif-
ferences there are few studies trying to understand and explain the 
detailed spatial pattern of populist right voting in Austria (for exceptions 
see Dijkstra et al., 2020; Essletzbichler & Forcher, 2021; Essletzbichler 
et al., 2018; Heinisch-Marent, 2016; Stockemer & Lamontagne, 2014). 
Halla et al. (2017) offer probably the most sophisticated econometric 
analysis of populist right voting in Austria. They were interested in 
isolating the impact of the rising share of foreign residents on the FPÖ 
vote share in Austrian municipalities for the period 1983–2013. In their 
research, they use municipalities as (population-weighted) 
cross-sectional observations without paying much attention to the type 
of region a municipality belonged to or to spatial spillovers between 
municipalities. Their purpose was not to explain the spatial patterns but 
to use spatial variation in voting outcomes to explain populist right 
voting in Austria as a whole. Furthermore, they used a panel approach 
thus eliminating substantial local variation by design. Cavaille and 
Ferwerda (2017) exploit cross sectional panel data to uncover the 
impact of competition for welfare-benefits-in-kind, in their case, social 
housing (see also Essletzbichler & Forcher, 2021), on the rise of the FPÖ 
vote after 2006. Again, this study is interested in isolating individual 
drivers of the FPÖ vote, but they are less interested in the spatial pat-
terns of the electoral outcome. Heinisch and Marent (2016) offer ex-
planations for differences in regional party organizations and electorate 
but only at the state level. Stockemer and Lamontagne (2014) examine 
spatial variation in FPÖ vote shares at the district level, but districts are 
still too heterogeneous and gloss over urban-rural differences, the 
impact of regional type on the FPÖ vote or the role of local spillover 
effects. 
In this paper we take on board insights from the existing literature on 
the potential drivers of the rising populist right vote in Austria but 
attempt to get a better understanding of the spatially varying charac-
teristics beyond the municipal shares of individual socio-demographic 
characteristics. In many respects, the Austrian space-economy is 
different from those of the UK or the United States where the arguments 
on the links between the “places left behind” and populist voting appear 
strong empirically (Essletzbichler et al., 2018; Rodriguez-Pose, 2018; 
Rodrik, 2018). In Austria, unemployment rates tend to be higher in 
urban centers, in particular Vienna, and not in the periphery. Deindus-
trialization occurred, but there is still a strong manufacturing export 
sector offering apprenticeships and jobs for those with little formal ed-
ucation. Furthermore, old mining regions and Alpine peripheral regions 
with large population losses do not necessarily vote for the populist right 
because the countryside (with notable historical-geographical excep-
tions) has voted for the Catholic-Conservative Austrian Peoples’ Party 
(ÖVP) for religious and cultural reasons. In order to keep the paper 
focused on the spatial aspects of voting in Austria, the empirical analysis 
focuses on the 2017 national elections and examines spatial differences 
in the changes of the FPÖ vote shares between 2013 and 2017. 2017 is 
the final year of the “Strache era” that was marked by extreme 
anti-immigration and anti-Muslim campaigning. We decided against a 
longer time frame as that would increase the difficulty of linking local 
changes in the FPÖ vote to particular events that may explain them. 
Also, because the BZÖ split from the FPÖ in 2005, but became unim-
portant after the death of Jörg Haider in 2008 (after being successful in 
the 2008 elections), excluding previous periods allowed us to focus on 
the FPÖ as only relevant populist right party. We focus on changes rather 
than levels in FPÖ vote shares because they allow us to examine 
explicitly spatially differentiated responses to current “crises”, in the 
case of this period, the increase in the number of asylum seekers and 
refugees between 2013 and 2017 as well as an increase in unemploy-
ment over this period. The “refugee crisis” was exploited by the FPÖ who 
was able to increase its national vote share by 5.5 percentage points. The 
increase in vote shares varied across municipalities ranging from a 
minimum of − 16.7 to a maximum of +25.0 percentage points. 
Drawing on the literature explaining the rise of populism and elec-
toral geography discussed above and situating those theoretical argu-
ment in the geohistorical context of the 2017 Austrian national 
elections, we formulate a number of expectations on the theoretical and 
empirical factors driving spatial variation in rising FPÖ vote shares. 
First, we attempt to examine whether the characteristics of the local 
population exerts an influence on the populist radical right vote. The 
literature on the role of new cultural cleavages argues that gender, age 
and education are important personal characteristics to understand the 
rise of the populist right (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Municipalities with 
higher shares of old, male and less educated voters comprise a larger 
potential voter pool susceptible to messages of political parties playing 
up the perceived “threat” of foreign immigration. We would thus expect 
municipalities with higher shares of old, male and less educated voters 
to exhibit larger increases in FPÖ voter shares. 
Second, we would expect local context to influence local FPÖ vote 
shares. As the election of 2017 was driven largely by concerns about the 
rising number of refugees and asylum seekers (Bodlos & Plescia, 2018; 
Plescia et al., 2020), we would expect FPÖ vote shares to increase more 
in municipalities with large increases in the share of foreign citizens. On 
the other hand, based on the contact hypothesis we would expect the 
share of foreign citizens (Allport, 1954; Essletzbichler et al., 2018; 
Golder, 2016) to be negatively related to increasing FPÖ vote shares. In 
addition to the share of foreign citizens, the local economic context in 
which voting takes place is expected to influence the populist right vote. 
We would expect rising FPÖ vote shares to be positively related to 
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increasing and high levels of unemployment in a municipality (Dijkstra 
et al., 2020; Essletzbichler et al., 2018). The change in unemployment 
can be understood as the likelihood of a person living in a particular 
municipality to lose her or his job while the level of unemployment is 
best understood as proxy for the current local economic conditions in 
which elections take place. Median income levels in a municipality are 
less likely to adjust as rapidly to current economic conditions than un-
employment. Thus, we take income as a general (long-term) measure of 
local prosperity. The richer the community the higher the economic 
security of its residents and the lower the fear of short term unem-
ployment or competition from foreign immigration (Bossert et al., 2019; 
Gidron & Hall, 2017). In addition, higher income inequality not only 
intensifies relative deprivation but also signals a potential threat of so-
cial decline as gaps in the social hierarchy widen (Engler & Weisstanner, 
2020; Gidron & Hall, 2017). 
Third, states are characterized by particular socio-cultural and ethnic 
cleavages and historical legacies that can be mobilized for populist 
agendas, they are home to powerful or weak local chapters of national 
parties, and they are also responsible for the provision and administra-
tion of selected welfare services that may influence voter preferences 
(Cavaille & Ferwerda, 2017; Manow, 2018). They form the regional 
rather than local context in which votes are cast. It is impossible to offer 
a detailed analysis of the historical, socio-cultural and political condi-
tions in all nine states but the following examples indicate why we might 
expect regional variation in FPÖ voter shares. The FPÖ has been and is 
most successful in Austria’s most Southern state of Carinthia. Jörg 
Haider, born in Upper Austria, launched his career in Carinthia where he 
could take advantage of a well-organized local party organization, a 
long-simmering conflict about the use of the Slovene language in the 
public sphere of ethnic minority areas, but also a strong sense of regional 
identity of “the forgotten province” that could be mobilized in opposi-
tion to the elites in Vienna (Heinisch & Marent, 2016). The strong 
aversion of the dominant Socialist Party in Vienna to form a coalition 
with the FPÖ and hence, the inability to govern, allowed the FPÖ to 
pursue an all-out voter seeking strategy relentlessly linking high immi-
gration rates with rising crime. In the most-Western province of Vor-
arlberg priding itself on relative political independence from the rest of 
the country, the Vorarlberg Freedom Party opted first to embrace liberal 
economic ideas rather than following the radicalization strategy of the 
national FPÖ and changed course only after 2000. Upper Austria’s high 
share of Protestantism and associated German nationalism resulted in 
stronger rural opposition to the Catholic ÖVP and increased the voter 
pool for the FPÖ. In parts of Styria, the remnants of a Slovenian minority 
allowed the FPÖ to exploit this cultural cleavage (Heinisch & Marent, 
2016). Because of those historically evolved differences, FPÖ vote shares 
and their changes are expected to differ systematically, but we do not 
formulate any specific expectations on the role of individual states on 
rising FPÖ vote shares between 2013 and 2017. Instead, in some of our 
empirical specifications we do control for state membership. 
Fourth, most of the recent work by economic geographers and 
economists on the populist right focuses on the changing role of regions 
in the global division of labor, the consequences for people living in 
those regions and in turn, their reaction to rising insecurity at the ballot 
box (Autor et al., 2017; Dijkstra et al., 2020; Gordon, 2018; Rodri-
guez-Pose, 2018; Rodrik, 2018). The focus of this work is on “places left 
behind”. In the Global North those places are assumed to be old indus-
trial regions and rural peripheries where jobs are becoming scarce and 
out-migration is often not an option for the less skilled and old. On the 
other hand, labor markets in urban centers and their commuter belts are 
assumed to benefit from tighter integration into the global economy. 
Thus, it is expected that voters in rural and old industrial regions are 
more likely to vote for populist right parties while voters in urban areas 
are less likely to vote for them. The question here is whether the type of 
region adds additional explanatory power for rising FPÖ vote shares. In 
the Austrian context one possible mediating influence of peripherality 
on electoral outcomes is the share of employment in the tourist industry 
as the tourist industry compensates for employment loss in the agri-
cultural and manufacturing sectors in many small, rural communities. 
This may explain some of the counter-intuitive results observed in the 
literature (Essletzbichler et al., 2018). While membership to central or 
peripheral regions or old industrial areas are expected to exert an in-
fluence on the size of the potential FPÖ voter pool, recent work also 
demonstrated that population decline is associated positively with 
populist right voting (Rodriguez-Pose et al., 2020). 
Fifth, while political geographers established the importance of a 
“neighborhood” context (Agnew, 1996; Cox, 1969; Pattie & Johnston, 
2000), it is unclear how far the “neighborhood” extends spatially, i.e. 
whether social network effects operate at the street, local neighborhood, 
municipal or wider scale. However, we try to capture possible spatial 
spillover channels in populist right voting by examining the link be-
tween the FPÖ vote share of neighboring municipalities in the previous 
election (i.e., 2013) and a municipality’s vote share in the current 
election (i.e., 2017). While a positive effect may indicate that social 
networks extend beyond municipal boundaries, it could also indicate 
another important social transmission channel, increased social 
acceptability of voting for a radical right party. The fact that neigh-
boring municipalities have voted for the radical right in the past imbues 
it with a certain social acceptability that reduces the inhibition to vote 
for a party that has been associated with National Socialism and German 
Nationalism in the past (Harteveld et al., 2017, 2019). Because the 
establishment of causal effects would require detailed information on 
individuals and their social networks, a positive spillover effect based on 
aggregate municipal voter results can only be an indication of the 
operation of these channels, but not proof of their existence. 
4. Methods and data 
In order to examine the impact of compositional differences, regional 
type membership and the role of spillover effects on the spatial patterns 
of changes in the FPÖ vote shares between 2013 and 2017, we estimate a 
set of cross-sectional models. Following Elhorst (2014), we specify a 
general nested spatial model of the form: 
y = δWy + αιN + Xβ + WXθ + u (1)  
u = λWu + ε (2)  
where y denotes an Nx1 vector consisting of one observation on the 
dependent variable, for every municipality i in the sample (i=1, 
…,2118), ιNis an Nx1 vector of ones associated with the constant term 
parameter α that is to be estimated, X is a NxK matrix of exogenous 
explanatory variables, β is an associated Kx1 vector with unknown pa-
rameters to be estimated and ε = (ε1,…, εN)
′
is a vector of disturbance 
terms, which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed 
for all i with zero mean and variance σ2. Wy refers to the endogenous 
interaction effect among the dependent variables, WX denotes the 
exogenous interaction effects among the independent variables and Wu 
the interaction effects among the disturbance term. δ is called typically 
the spatial autoregressive coefficient, λ the spatial autocorrelation co-
efficient, θ is a Kx1 vector of fixed but unknown parameters to be esti-
mated and W is a spatial weights matrix. 
Elhorst (2014) shows how different spatial model types (eg. Spatial 
Durbin Error Model (SDEM), Spatial Durbin Model (SDM), Autore-
gressive Spatial Model (SAC)) are nested in Model (1). If θ = 0; we 
obtain the SAC, if λ = 0 we obtain the SDM, if δ = 0 we obtain the SDEM. 
It can be further shown that the spatial lag model (SLM) (λ = 0, θ = 0), 
the spatial lag of X model (SLX) (λ = 0 , δ = 0) and the spatial error 
model (SEM) (δ = 0, θ = 0) are nested in the former group of models 
and if δ = 0, λ = 0, θ = 0 the model reduces to a simple linear model 
without spatial terms. Starting with the simple linear model we add 
gradually variables to capture broad regional and local spillover effects 
to examine possible reasons for sustained spatial variation in the 
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changes of FPÖ vote shares. We need to accomplish two tasks. First, we 
want to examine the arguments on possible reasons for spatial variation 
in voter shares. Second, in order to be confident that our parameter 
estimates are unbiased and efficient, we need to develop a stable 
econometric model. Our choice for the spatial econometric specification 
to address these issues is guided by the model selection process of 
Elhorst (2014). We use maximum likelihood (ML) for the estimation 
part. Using commuting patterns as a measure of spatial relationship, the 
robust versions of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests point clearly to-
ward a SEM-type model. 
We start with a discussion of the dependent and independent vari-
ables for a basic a-spatial linear model estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS). The choice of variables is informed by the theoretical and 
empirical literature discussed above. Our dependent variable is the 
percentage point change of the FPÖ vote share between the 2013 and 
2017 elections. The names and definitions of our independent variables 
are summarized in Table 1. 
Next, we turn to the discussion of our independent variables and start 
with those variables expressing geographic differences in relevant voter 
characteristics. We control for gender differences among municipalities 
through the share of women among Austrian citizens, for age differences 
through the share of all Austrian4 citizens in one of seven age groups and 
for education as the share of Austrians with compulsory (or no) educa-
tion only, apprenticeships, A-levels and university degree. We omit the 
share of under 15 year olds and the share with university degree from 
our models as base categories. 
We next justify our “contextual variables”. We distinguish between 
the share of foreign citizens and the increase in the share of foreign 
citizens. Although foreign citizens include more than refugees, it is un-
likely that voters can distinguish easily between refugees and foreign 
(looking) citizens. Furthermore, the rising number of refugees was 
mobilized to rally voters against immigration in general. We thus believe 
that the share of foreign residents rather than the share of refugees 
(which tends to be substantially smaller and less visible) to increase the 
populist right vote share. However, as robustness checks we also esti-
mated models that replace the share of foreign citizens with the share of 
refugees (and increase in the share of refugees). The results turn out to 
be insignificant and are available for interested readers upon request. 
Spatial variation in economic conditions is represented by four var-
iables: the percentage point change in the unemployment rate between 
2013 and 2017, the unemployment rate, median income and inequality 
in 2017. In line with the literature (eg., Dijkstra et al., 2020) and our 
discussion above we expect the rate of change in unemployment rates, 
the unemployment rate and inequality to be positively and median in-
come negatively related to rising FPÖ vote shares. The results for the 
model including immigration, compositional and contextual effects are 
presented in Table 3, Model 1. 
In order to evaluate whether compositional effects are sufficient to 
explain spatial variation in populist right voting in Austria, a number of 
additional “spatial” variables are added to the base specification. We 
control for the state in which municipalities reside with state dummy 
variables. Results for this model are reported in Table 3, model 2. The 
parameter estimates for the state dummies are added in the Appendix 
(Table A1). 
We examine the impact of municipal membership to regional types 
on electoral decisions by employing the regional classification of Sta-
tistik Austria (2018) allocating all municipalities to eleven regional 
types according to two dimensions: population density and accessibility 
of urban centers. Based on this classification we define all rural mu-
nicipalities without fast access to large urban centers as periphery 
(regional types R320, R330, R420, R430) and all large urban munici-
palities as urban centers (R101). In the Austrian context one possible 
mediating influence of peripherality on electoral decisions is the share of 
employment in the tourist industry as the tourist industry compensates 
for employment loss in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors in 
many small, rural communities. We thus add a dummy variable indi-
cating whether a municipality is classified as tourist area or not. 
Furthermore, we define those municipalities that were classified as Type 
2 Region (old industrial areas with declining employment) in the 
1995–1999 EU funding cycle as old industrial areas (ÖROK, 2020). And 
finally, in order to evaluate the impact of long-term population decline 
on electoral decisions (not all rural and industrial areas decline) we 
calculate the percentage change of a municipality’s population between 
1981 and 2011. We expect that the parameter estimates for periphery 
and old industrial exhibit positive signs while the parameter estimates 
for urban center, tourism and population change are expected to exhibit 
a negative sign. The empirical results are depicted in Table 3, Model 3. 
Most of the existing empirical work on the geography of populist 
right voting stops at this stage of analysis. This paper attempts to com-
plement this work and examine possible spatial spillover channels in 
populist right voting. Rather than adding a spatially lagged y variable we 
develop a variable that captures the difference between the FPÖ vote 
share of neighboring municipalities and a municipality in 2013. In 
generating this variable we assumed that voters are more likely to 
interact with other voters in geographically contiguous municipalities 
and we thus used the queen contiguity measure as a measure of neigh-
borhood. In our case queen contiguity assigns on average 5.8 neighbors 
to an observation. Notice that this specification is a form of SLX model 
where we limit the lagged X variables to the transformed variable of the 
FPÖ vote share of 2013 as we found it difficult to argue that other 
Table 1 
Explanatory variables.  
Variable Description (expected relationship with FPÖ 
vote share increases in parentheses) 
Share of foreign citizens Percentage share of foreign citizens, 2017 (-) 
Change in share of foreign 
citizens 
Difference in foreign citizen shares, 2017–2013 
(þ) 
“Economic” variables 
Change in unemployment rate Difference in unemployment rate, Austrian 
citizens, 2017–2013 (þ) 
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate, Austrian citizens, 2017 (þ) 
Economic prosperity Ln of median income, 2017 (-) 
Inequality GINI coefficient, 2017 (þ) 
“Cultural” variables 
Age Share of Austrian citizens in 10-year age groups, 
2017; Share of under 15 year old is omitted to 
avoid perfect multicollinearity. Below 25 (-); 
25–45 (~); above 45 (þ) 
Gender Percentage of women among Austrian citizens, 
2017 (-) 
Education Percentage shares of Austrian citizens above 25 
with compulsory education (+), apprenticeship 
(þ), A-levels (~); university education (-); 
university shares are omitted to avoid perfect 
collinearity 
Spatial variables 
States Indicator variables for nine states; Vienna is 
omitted to avoid perfect multicollinearity (?) 
Regional types: Urban, old 
industrial, periphery, tourism 
Dummy variables for urban center (-), periphery 
(þ), old industrial (þ), touristic municipalities 
(-). See text for explanation. 
Long-term decline Rate of change of total population in a 
municipality, 1981-2011 (-) 
Spatial spillover effects 
Local FPÖ vote spillover Difference between FPÖ share of neighboring 
municipalities and FPÖ vote share in 
municipality, 2013 (spatial weights based on 
queen contiguity measure) (þ) 
λ  Spatial error term (spatial weights based on 
commuting patterns) (þ);  
4 We calculate unemployment rates, gender, age, and educational variables 
for Austrian citizens only as only Austrian citizens are allowed to vote in na-
tional elections. 
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spatially lagged of X variables should influence the FPÖ vote share in-
creases. We also believe that this specification of spillovers captures 
better the actual transmission process as it is unclear how people could 
react to changes in FPÖ vote shares in neighboring communities (as 
would be measured in a standard spatial lag model) when they do not 
know yet what the outcome of the current election would be. We expect 
this variable, Local FPÖ vote spillover, to be positively related to the 
FPÖ vote share change: The larger the difference between the FPÖ vote 
share in neighboring municipalities in 2013 and a municipality’s FPÖ 
vote share, the higher the expected increase in a municipality’s FPÖ vote 
share. The results of this model correspond to those of Model 4 (Table 3). 
We also experimented with other distance measures to define neighbors, 
but the results remain robust to these changes.5 
Despite these efforts to model explicitly spatial context and spill-
overs, Moran’s I values of the regression residuals indicate persistent 
spatial autocorrelation suggesting possibly biased or inefficient param-
eter estimates for Models 1–4. As we controlled for broad regional effects 
as well as spillovers of the FPÖ vote already, and after testing for al-
ternatives as described at the beginning of this section, we treat the 
remaining spatial autocorrelation as a result of unobserved spatial 
processes and thus run a spatial error model (δ = 0, θ = 0). To capture 
these processes we take a broader view on social interaction and assume 
that these effects are driven by regions that people frequently interact 
with. To formalize this hypothesis we use bilateral commuting patterns 
as inverse weights, where strong commuter relations between two re-
gions would represent frequent interaction. Hence, the main differences 
in our approach are (a) that we limit the lagged X variables to a trans-
formed variable of the FPÖ vote share of 2013 which is especially 
relevant for our question of neighborhood effects and (b) that we use 
different weights matrices for the error term and spatial lag, to capture 
the appropriate transmission channels. The results for this model are 
presented in Table 3, Model 5. 
5. Empirical results 
To set the scene, Fig. 2 depicts the percentage point change in mu-
nicipalities’ FPÖ vote shares between 2013 and 2017. It indicates the 
existence of spatial patterns in changes of FPÖ vote shares: First, there 
appear to be larger increases in the municipalities of the Eastern states 
Lower Austria and Burgenland and a decline in the state of Vienna. 
However, all states exhibit substantial spatial heterogeneity in FPÖ vote 
changes. Second, there are clusters of large increases in FPÖ vote shares 
in the peripheral areas of Lower Austria and Burgenland, but not in the 
Alpine or Western periphery where tourism constitutes an important 
source of income. Third, FPÖ vote share changes appear substantially 
lower (or declining) in the large urban areas of Vienna, Graz, Linz, St. 
Pölten, Salzburg, Klagenfurt, Innsbruck and Bregenz. We next turn to the 
summary of the regression analyses. 
Table 2 complements Fig. 2 and depicts the average municipal per-
centage point changes for the different types of regions, states and totals. 
It illustrates that, on average, municipalities in the Eastern states of 
Burgenland and Lower Austria registered the largest increase in the FPÖ 
vote shares, while FPÖ vote shares in Vienna declined. Comparing the 
functional type of regions, Table 2 shows that peripheral municipalities, 
in general, registered the largest increases in FPÖ votes over this period 
while the urban centers registered the lowest. They are particularly high 
in Burgenland and Lower Austria. Municipalities with a relatively high 
dependence on tourism and municipalities classified as old industrial 
areas tended to exhibit smaller increases in FPÖ vote shares than their 
respective states as a whole. These results are consistent with the ex-
pectations formulated above (save for the old industrial regions for 
which we expected higher gains in FPÖ vote shares). We now check 
whether these results are robust to the inclusion of other explanatory 
variables. 
Table 3 summarizes the results for the Models (1)–(5) described 
above. We start with a discussion of the impact of our explanatory 
variables and focus on the impact of the share of foreign citizens first. As 
hypothesized, the change in the share of foreign citizens is statistically 
significant and positive while the share of foreign citizens in 2017 is 
statistically significant and negative. The results are robust to the 
introduction of spatial control variables and suggest that a local increase 
in foreign citizens is perceived as possible threat and competition for 
jobs and local welfare services (Cavaille & Ferwerda, 2017; Golder, 
2016; Manow, 2018; Rodrik, 2018). On the other hand, the negative 
parameter estimate for the level of foreigners is consistent with Allport’s 
(1954) contact hypothesis. 
We next turn to variables capturing various aspects of the economic 
context of municipalities. The rate of unemployment is insignificant in 
all models, while the change in the rate of unemployment is positive and 
statistically significant for the first three models only. Introducing 
spillover effects and a spatial error term renders this variable insignifi-
cant. The parameter estimates for income and inequality exhibit, for the 
most part, the expected signs. (Bossert et al., 2019; Engler & Weis-
stanner, 2020). Relatively prosperous municipalities are less likely to 
show an increase in the FPÖ vote while those with higher levels of 
inequality do. 
As the socio-cultural composition of a municipality was not of pri-
mary interest, we do not discuss further age and gender control vari-
ables. We do report the coefficients for the educational variables as they 
turned out to be among the most relevant explanatory variables to 
explain rising FPÖ vote shares. In particular the share of those with 
compulsory or no education and the share of Austrians with appren-
ticeships is positively and significantly related to rising FPÖ shares. The 
share of those with A-levels is significant in the base specification only. 
The importance of education has been confirmed in work on the spatial 
variation of the BREXIT vote (Goodwin & Heath, 2016; Gordon, 2018). 
Models 2 and 3 control for broad spatial differences in the FPÖ vote 
share. Model 2 introduces state dummies. Although only two of them 
(Burgenland and Lower Austria; see Table A1 in the Appendix) are 
significantly higher than the base category (Vienna), the inclusion of 
state dummies improves the model fit substantially. The inclusion of 
dummies for functional regional types (Model 3) yields the expected 
negative sign for tourist regions but, contrary to expectations, a negative 
sign for old industrial regions. The estimates for urban centers, periph-
ery and population decline are not statistically significant. Notice that 
all parameter estimates for regional types become insignificant once we 
control for local spillovers in the FPÖ vote and include a spatial error 
term. This suggests that spatial effects in form of local spillovers may be 
more important than membership to functional regional types. 
Model 4 adds the local FPÖ spillover variable. This variable is sta-
tistically significant and has the expected sign. If neighboring munici-
palities had, on average, a one percentage point higher FPÖ share in 
2013, then a municipality is expected to exhibit a 0.2 percentage point 
increase in the FPÖ vote share between 2013 and 2017. Moran’s I on the 
regression residuals indicate the presence of spatial dependence in 
models (1)–(4). With the inclusion of a spatial error term (λ) we try to 
capture the remaining spatial structure in the error term and find that 
our estimates by and large remain consistent to this specification. The 
parameter estimates of the share of foreigners, income, inequality, low 
educational attainment as well local FPÖ spillovers remain significant 
after the inclusion of the spatial error term. As all dummy variables for 
various regional types as well as long-term population change are 
insignificant, we contend that spatial patterns in populist right voting in 
Austria appear represented better through local spatial spillover pro-
cesses than membership to broad functional types. 
5 The results of this analysis are available from the authors upon request. 
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6. Conclusion 
The paper examined the spatial variation in the increase of the 
populist right vote in Austria. It adds to the existing literature on 
populist right voting in “places left behind” by developing a sequence of 
econometric models adding spatial indicator and spillover variables to 
the usual a-spatial cross-sectional models. The dangers of omitting 
spatial dependence from the analysis are potentially biased and/or 
inefficient parameter estimates for variables representing the impact of 
economic and cultural cleavages on populism. But more importantly, the 
neglect of local spillovers excludes from models local processes of in-
formation exchange that may influence electoral outcomes. 
The results of our analysis are consistent with a number of hypoth-
eses on the rise of populist parties (Brubaker, 2017) but are less 
conclusive about the role of regional structural disadvantage in the face 
of globalization and skill-biased technological change. In line with the 
literature on the impact of immigration, local economic context and 
socio-cultural composition on populist right voting we find that an in-
crease in the share of foreign citizens, the level of inequality and the 
share of voters with low educational attainment levels have significant 
and positive effects on the increasing FPÖ vote shares while the median 
income level and the share of foreign citizens yield negative and sig-
nificant parameter estimates. These results are robust to the introduc-
tion of spatial variables. The significant impact of the change of 
unemployment on rising populist right vote shares disappears once we 
control for local spillover effects. 
The introduction of spatial variables resulted in a substantially better 
model fit and the parameter estimates on broad regional variables and 
local spillover effects help to shed light on additional processes influ-
encing the populist vote that go beyond simple compositional effects. In 
the Austrian context, the unique historical trajectories of the nine states 
and their impact on the socio-cultural and economic context translate 
into broad regional differences in the populist right vote. While the 
introduction of state dummies proved important for the analysis, the 
Fig. 2. Percentage point change in municipalities’ FPÖ vote shares, 2013–2017. 
Source: www.wahldatenbank.at; own calculations. 
Table 2 
Percentage point change of the FPÖ vote shares, 2013–2017; Municipal averages.  
Provinces (States) Urban “Suburban” Periphery Tourist Old Ind. All #OBS 
Burgenland N/A 5.20 7.48 5.19 N/A 6.79 171 
Carinthia − 0.32 4.06 4.18 2.96 N/A 4.02 132 
Lower Austria 1.80 5.19 8.23 5.50 5.04 6.08 573 
Upper Austria 1.70 3.14 4.16 1.64 2.24 3.38 438 
Salzburg − 0.04 1.85 1.48 0.88 N/A 1.47 119 
Styria − 0.19 3.06 4.30 2.87 1.74 3.36 287 
Tyrol 2.91 3.88 3.90 3.87 N/A 3.81 279 
Vorarlberg 2.33 2.22 0.35 1.62 2.20 2.07 96 
Vienna − 1.71 N/A N/A N/A N/A − 1.71 23 
Austria 1.08 3.83 5.67 2.97 2.71 4.26 2118 
Notes: N/A means that these types of regions do not exist in the respective states. The most eastern state of Burgenland does not contain any urban centers, while all of 
Vienna’s 23 districts are classified as urban centers. Urban = urban centers; Suburban = municipalities of low density but good access to urban centers; Periphery =
rural municipalities with poor access to centers; Tourist = municipalities classified as tourist municipalities; Old. Ind. = Municipalities classified as old industrial 
regions; See text, Statistik Austria (2018) and ÖROK (2020). 
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postulated relationship between the influence of the structural disad-
vantage in “places left behind” and increasing populist vote share is not 
confirmed for the Austrian case. Neither the expected negative rela-
tionship with urban centers and population change nor the expected 
positive relationship with old industrial and peripheral regions are 
observed once we controlled for compositional, contextual and local 
spillover effects. Contrary to expectations, and after controlling for 
compositional effects and state membership, old industrial municipal-
ities exhibited significantly lower increases in FPÖ vote shares. All 
regional type variables turn insignificant once we add a spatial error 
term. Various reasons may explain why the Austrian case does not fit the 
usual explanations on the link between populist right voting and the 
“places left behind” (Dijkstra et al., 2020; Essletzbichler et al., 2018; 
Gordon, 2018). 
First, the results suggest that globalization and skill-biased techno-
logical change do not have the same positive and negative impacts on 
core and periphery as in the UK and US context where those effects are 
more pronounced (Essletzbichler et al., 2018; Rodriguez-Pose, 2018). In 
Austria, unemployment rates are higher in urban centers than in rural 
areas, the manufacturing sector still offers jobs and good wages for the 
relatively unskilled in rural areas and tourism may compensate in part 
for loss of employment in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. 
Second, as local spillover processes appear important, the simple 
allocation of municipalities to regional types may be insufficient to 
capture adequately the differential impact of globalization on local 
electoral outcomes. Third, the explicit introduction of local spatial 
spillover processes, spatial error or lag terms could result in insignificant 
parameter estimates for regional variables in other national contexts as 
well. This could be established through the application of spatial 
econometric models in those contexts. However, as the parameter esti-
mates for various forms of regional types are either insignificant or 
exhibit the wrong sign even without correction for spatial spillover 
and/or spatial error, it is more likely that the link between variables 
representing locational disadvantage and populism is not observed in 
the Austrian case. Fourth, it is possible that the functional type of the 
region a municipality belongs is more appropriate for explaining 
sub-national differences in the levels rather than changes in the FPÖ 
vote as FPÖ vote shares may have risen in the past but are now stabi-
lizing at a high level. 
Introducing observed and unobserved local spillover effects 
improved the model fit substantially and suggests that the introduction 
of those variables complements existing analysis and adds to our un-
derstanding of spatial variation in populist right voting. It also points 
towards the importance of locally constrained social networks for elec-
toral decisions as voting decisions cannot be reduced to individual 
electoral preferences developed in a social vacuum (Agnew & Shin, 
Table 3 
Regression results (robust standard errors in parentheses).   
(1) Base (2) Fixed Effects (3) Regions (4) SLX (5) SEM-SLX 
Log income − 6.83*** − 8.70*** − 8.28*** − 7.90*** − 8.01*** 
(1.25) (1.18) (1.27) (1.22) (1.28) 
Gini − 0.62 8.91** 9.38** 8.94** 10.15*** 
(3.64) (3.23) (3.25) (3.14) (3.00) 
%-unemployed 0.06 − 0.07* − 0.04 − 0.02 0.02 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Δ %-unemployed 0.27*** 0.16** 0.13* 0.08 0.04 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
%-foreign born − 0.10*** − 0.07*** − 0.07*** − 0.06*** − 0.07*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Δ %-foreign born 0.17** 0.16** 0.16** 0.16*** 0.17*** 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
% apprentices 0.09** 0.07** 0.09** 0.14*** 0.20*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
% compulsory 0.26*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
% A-levels 0.18*** − 0.08* − 0.06 − 0.05 − 0.07 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Tourism reg. − 0.78*** − 0.83*** − 0.43 
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Periphery reg. 0.31 0.28 − 0.06 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) 
Old industrial reg. − 0.82** − 0.76** 0.11 
(0.30) (0.29) (0.39) 
Urban centers − 0.00 0.19 0.03 
(0.32) (0.31) (0.29) 
Population decline − 0.15 0.38 0.41 
(0.44) (0.43) (0.40) 
Local FPÖ vote spillover  0.20*** 0.21***  
(0.02) (0.01) 
λ (commute region)   0.93***   
(0.01) 
Age/Gender controls YES YES YES YES YES 
State controls NO YES YES YES YES 
Num. obs 2118 2118 2118 2118 2118 
Parameters 18 26 31 32 33 
(Pseudo) R2 0.23 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.51 
AIC 11,075 10,537 10,525 10,373 10,134 
Moran’s I (ϵ) 23.28 (0.00) 12.14 (0.00) 11.32 (0.00) 12.77 (0.00) 1.00 (0.16) 
Log Likelihood − 5034.14 
LR test: statistic 240.44 
LR test: p-value 0.00 
***p < 0.001. 
**p < 0.01. 
*p < 0.05. 
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2020; Zuckerman, 2005). However, without individual level data we are 
unable to ascertain the operation of this causal channel. 
Table A1 







(4) SLX (5) SEM- 
SLX 
Burgenland  3.49*** 3.59*** 3.30*** 2.95***   
(0.84) (0.86) (0.83) (0.68) 
Carinthia  1.00 1.23 0.86 − 0.42   
(0.84) (0.86) (0.83) (1.32) 
Lower 
Austria  
3.32*** 3.49*** 3.17*** 3.12***   
(0.80) (0.83) (0.80) (0.52) 
Upper 
Austria  
− 0.76 − 0.46 − 0.89 1.03   
(0.79) (0.82) (0.79) (0.99) 
Salzburg  − 1.73* − 1.32 − 1.90* − 0.11   
(0.82) (0.85) (0.82) (1.24) 
Styria  − 0.94 − 0.50 − 0.99 0.30   
(0.83) (0.85) (0.83) (0.99) 
Tyrol  0.20 0.72 0.15 − 1.69   
(0.77) (0.81) (0.79) (1.57) 
Vorarlberg  − 0.53 − 0.13 − 0.61 − 3.66   
(0.83) (0.85) (0.82) (2.49) 
***p < 0.001. 
**p < 0.01. 
*p < 0.05. 
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